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VACCARINO v. COZZUBO

SELLER'S LIABILITY ON IMPLIED WARRANTY OF
WHOLESOMENESS AND FITNESS FOR CONSUMPTION IN SALE OF FOOD TO CONSUMER CONTRACTING TRICHINOSIS
-NECESSITY
OF PRIVITY OF
CONTRACT
Vaccarino v. Cozzubo'

Plaintiff-appellee's daughter, with money furnished by
his wife, purchased sausage from defendant-appellant, a
retail dealer operating a grocery and meat store. After
having been cooked by the wife, the sausage was eaten by
plaintiff and his family, and all subsequently were found
to have contracted trichinosis. 2 Plaintiff sued for damages
for breach of warranty of wholesomeness and fitness for
consumption, and recovered judgment, the trial court instructing the jury that if they found that the plaintiff was
infected with trichinosis as a result of eating the sausage,
their verdict should be for the plaintiff. On appeal, this
was reversed and the case remanded for new trial.
The Court of Appeals considered first the defendant's
contention that there was no privity of contract between
himself and the plaintiff. While agreeing that such privity
was requisite, it nevertheless regarded the requirement
as satisfied, on the theory that the wife and daughter were
acting as plaintiff's agents in helping him to carry out his
obligation to support and maintain the family. The Court
then went on to discuss the implied warranties rising under
the Uniform Sales Act,3 saying: "It is absolutely clear that
there was an implied warranty in this case that the sausage
was of merchantable quality and reasonably fit for human
consumption." This, however, it was held, extends no further than that the meat was fit for human consumption
when properly cooked, and "the jury should have been
authorized to give a verdict for the plaintiff only in case
they found that the plaintiff was, infected with trichinosis
by eating the sausage after it was cooked in the usual or
proper manner."
131 A. (2d) 316 (Md., 1943).
' Trichinosis is defined by the Court as "a disease caused by trichinae,
nematodes which are occasionally found in pork and which breed in the
human body, causing muscular swelling, pain and fever". The disease is
one causing serious disability, sometimes death. In the instant case, plaintiff is stated to have been unable to do even light work for nearly a year.
" Uniform Sales Act, Sec. 15 (1), (2) ; Md. Code (1939) Art. 83, See. 33

(1), (2).
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In holding privity of contract necessary to support a
suit for breach of warranty, the Court was in accord with
prior authority in Maryland. 4 It was also in accord with
what was formerly at least the undoubted weight of authority generally.5 There is a respectable and increasing
body of authority, however, denying that such privity is
requisite and allowing maintenance of such an action independently of negligence or the traditional views as to
necessity for privity of contract; recent cases in many
jurisdictions show a decided trend in this direction and it
may even be that they represent the present weight of authority.6 The conflicting views on this point have occasioned considerable comment, usually with reference to
the warranty liability of manufacturers to sub-purchasers,
but also in cases such as the instant one, where suit is
dealer by one other than the imbrought against a retail
7
mediate purchaser.
' Flaccomio v. Eysink, 129 Md. 367, 100 A. 510 (1916) ; State v. Consolidated Gas, Elec. L. & P. Co., 146 Md. 390, 126 A. 105 (1924) ; Poplar v.
Hochschild, Kohn & Co., 180 Md. 389, 24 A. (2d) 783 (1942), noted (1942)
7 Md. L. Rev. 82.
See, e. g., Birmingham Cheri-Cola Bottling Co. v. Clark, 205 Ala. 678,
89 S. 64 (1921) ; Nelson v. Armour Packing Co., 76 Ark. 352, 90 S. W. 288
(1905) ; Drury v. Armour, 140 Ark. 371, 216 S. W. 40 (1919) ; Abercrombie
v. Union Portland Cement Co., 35 Ida. 231, 205 P. 1118 (1922) ; Prater v.
Campbell, 110 Ky. 23, 60 S. W. 918 (1901); Nehi Bottling Co. v. Thomas,
236 Ky. 684, 33 S. W. (2d) 701 (1930) ; Pelletier v. Dupont, 124 Me. 269,
128 A. 186. (1925) ; Roberts v. Anheuser Busch Assoc., 211 Mass. 449, 98
N. E. 95 (1912) ; Gearing v. Berkson, 223 Mass. 257, 111 N. E. 785 (1916) ;
Hazleton v. First Nat. Stores, 88 N. H. 409, 190 A. 280 (1937) ; Smith v.
Salem Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 25 A. (2d) 125 (N. H., 1942) ; Tomlinson v.
Armour, 75 N. J. L. 748, 70 A. 314 (1908) ; Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235
N. Y. 468, 139 N. E. 576 (1923) ; Tomlinson v. Ballard & Ballard, 208 N. C.
1, 179 S. E. 30 (1935) ; Crigger v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 132 Tenn. 545,
179 S. W. 155 (1915): Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Sullivan, 178 Tenn. 405,
158 S. W. (2d) 721 (1942).
8 See the following series of notes: 142 A. L. R. 490; 140 A. L. R. 191;
111 A. L. R. 1239; 105 A. L. R. 1502; 88 A. L. R. 527; 63 A. L. R. 340; 39
A. L. R. 993; 17 A. L. R. 672. See also, Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14
Cal. (2d) 272, 19 P. (2d) 799 (1939) ; Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189
Iowa 775, 176 N. W. 382 (1920) ; Parks v. C. C. Yost Pie Co., 93 Kan. 334,
144 P. 202 (1914); Hertzler v. Manshum, 228 Mich. 416, 200 N. W. 155
(1924); Rainwater v. Hattiesburg Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 131 Miss. 315,
95 S. 444 (1923); Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111
S. 305 (1927) ; Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Co., 230 Mo. App. 275,
90 S. W. (2d) 445 (1936) ; Helms v. General Baking Co., 164 S. W. (2d)
150 (Mo. App., 1942); Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Oh. App. 475, 161
N. E. 557 (1928) ; Catani v. Swift, 251 Pa. 52, 95 A. 931 (1915) ; Nock v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 102 Pa. Super. 515, 156 A. 537 (1931) ; Jacob
E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S. W. (2d) 828 (1942);
Mazette v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633 (1913) : Dobrenski v.
Blatz Brewing Co., 41 F. Supp. 291 (D. C. Mich., 1941) ; Ketterer v. Armour
& Co., 200 F. 322 (D. C. S. D. N. Y., 1912).
7 See the series of A. L. R. notes cited supra, n. 6, and, in addition,
Jeanblanc, Manufacturers' Liability to Persons Other Than Their Imnediate Vendees (1937) 24 Va. L. Rev. 134, 146-149; Perkins, Unwholesome
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The traditional majority view proceeds upon the basis
that warranties in sales transactions, whether viewed as
agreements collateral to the principal contract of sale or
as conditions thereof, are in any event contractual in origin,
and can consequently give rise to neither rights nor obligations except insofar as a contractual relationship is established. "The implied warranty, or to speak more accurately
the implied condition of the contract, to supply an article
fit for the purpose required, is in the nature of a contract
of personal indemnity with the original purchaser."' Even
though it be regarded as annexed by rule of law, and not
itself consensual, the law annexes it to a contract, which
must therefore exist before there can be any warranty
obligation.
Against this, it is urged that while this is undeniably
true as to express warranties given in connection with a
sale transaction, implied warranties are not, either historically or otherwise, promissory in character and do not
arise out of any agreement by the seller, but are on the
contrary imposed upon him by operation of law, independently of any agreement on his part, as a matter of
public policy; that they exist, of course, where there is
privity of contract, but not because thereof; that they consequently should not be limited to cases where privity
exists but should be extended to any other case where the
same considerations of policy exist. So, in a very carefully
considered and thoughtful recent opinion, it is said:
"It has long been a well established rule that in
sales of food for domestic use there is an implied warranty that it is wholesome and fit for human consumption. A majority of the American courts that have followed this holding have not based such warranty upon
an implied term in the contract between buyer and
seller, nor upon any reliance by the buyer on the representations of the seller, but have imposed it as a
matter of public policy in order to discourage the sale
of unwholesome food ....
We believe the better and
sounder rule places liability solidly on the ground of a
warranty not in contract but imposed by law as a matFood as a Source of Liability (1919) 5 Iowa L. Bull., 6, 86-102; Bohlen,
Liability of Manufacturers to Persons Other Than Their Immediate Vendees (1929) 45 L. Quart. Rev. 343; Harris, Liability to Consumers for Unwholesome Food (1932) 9 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 360; Note (1937) 21 Minn.
L. Rev. 315, 321-325; WILrIsToN, SALES (2nd Ed. 1924) Sec. 244, 244a;
VoLD, SALES (1931) 474, 477.

8
DeCourcy, J., in Gearing v. Berkson, cited supra, n. 5; quoted with
approval in Flaccornio v. Eysink, 129 Md. 367, 385.
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ter of public policy .... The policy of the law to protect the health and life of the public would only be
half served if we were to make liability depend on the
ordinary contractual warranty.... As said in Ketterer
v. Armour & Co., D. C., 200 F. 322, 323-'The remedies
of injured consumers ought not to be made to depend
upon the intricacies of the law of sales. The obligation
of the manufacturer should not be based alone upon
privity of contract. It should rest, as was once said,
upon the demands of social justice.' "
There are undoubtedly considerations of public policy
operating against as well as in favor of a widening of the
seller's liability for defects in his goods, in the absence of
negligence or agreement to be answerable on his part.
Spurious claims are easy to feign and difficult to disprove. °
Yet these considerations exist also where privity of contract exists and the obligation of the seller rests on nothing
more than a warranty implied by law from the fact of sale
alone. It seems somewhat difficult to defend or justify in
principle a rule which holds a seller of food, himself without fault or voluntary assumption of liability, answerable
to an injured consumer with whom he has directly dealt
but not to another whose injury is equally severe. The
considerations of policy that render him liable in the one
case would seem to apply equally in the other and to depend not at all upon the presence or absence of a contractual relationship between seller and buyer.
Not infrequently an injured consumer has been allowed
to recover for breach of warranty, where no actual privity
of contract existed, by the use of artificial fictions that have
been held to satisfy the requirement of privity. So it has
been held that a manufacturer selling to his immediate
vendee makes the sale for the benefit of eventual users of
his product, who may consequently sue as third party
beneficiaries;" that implied warranties "run with the
0 Alexander,

C. J., in Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, cited supra, n. 6.

10 So it has been said: "There are those who trump up claims. There are

those who make a business of it. There are perjured doctors, bogus injuries. There are cumulative claims against each of six defendants, on the
basis of a single genuine sickness. And a false claim resting on poisoning
from foodstuffs based on warranty is not easy to defend, on the facts."
LLEWnLLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SALES (1930) 343.
1
Dryden v. Continental Baking Co., 4 Cal. (2d) 33, 77 P. (2d) 833
(1938); Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Oh. App. 475, 161 N. E. 557
(1928).
Cf. Menaker v. Supplee-Willis-Jones Milk Co., 125 Pa. Super. 76,
189 A. 714 (1937) ; Lockett v. Charles, Ltd., 159 L. T. R. 547 (K. B. D.,
1938).
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goods"; 12 that one not the immediate vendee may yet sue
as assignee of his rights.13 Such holdings, it is submitted,
constitute in essence an abandonment of the requirement
of privity of contract. They are but roundabout ways of
saying that it need not actually be present.I a They are significant as indicating a widely held belief that the traditional rule causes unsound and unjust results, arousing a
consequent desire to find some way of evading it without
completely departing from it.
The Court of Appeals in the instant case seems influenced by a similar feeling in allowing a right of action to
one not the immediate purchaser by indulging in the fiction
of an agency relation between him and the actual purchaser-a fiction, in that it is a relationship not based upon
any act or agreement of the parties but imposed wholly by
operation of law. A similar result was reached by the
Massachusetts Court in Gearing v. Berkson.14 While the
Court is thus able both to adhere to and to evade the rule
requiring privity of contract, it may well have made possible somewhat bizarre results. For presumably neither
the wife nor the daughter, who actually bought the meat,
would themselves have any right to recover against the
seller for breach of warranty, the contract of purchase
being made, not in their individual and personal capacity,
but as agents for the husband and father. It was so held at
least in the Massachusetts case, which, as has been pointed
out,1 5 was quoted with approval, and indeed extensively
relied upon by the Court of Appeals in Flaccomio v. Eysink. A rule which, in order to allow a right of action to
one member of the family not the actual purchaser, would
12 Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N. W. 382 (1920) ;
Anderson v. Tyler, 223 Iowa 1033, 274 N. W. 48 (1937) ; Coca-Cola Bottling
Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 S. 305 (1927); Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
v. Smith, 97 S. W. (2d) 761 (Tex. Civ. App., 1936).
18 See WILisToN, SALIs (2nd Ed., 1924) Sec. 244 for discussion of this
theory.
"I The same may be said of holdings that though, in the absence of
privity of contract, an injured consumer must sue in tort, negligence is presumed from the mere fact of sale of unwholesome food. See, e. g., Troletto
v. Hammond Co., 110 F. (2d) 135 (C. C. A. 6th, 1940). Cf. in Maryland
Goldman & Freiman Bottling Co. v. Sindell, 140 Md. 488, 117 A. 866 (1922) ;
Salisbury Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Lowe, 176 Md. 230, 4 A. (2d) 440
(1939) ; Armour & Co. v. League, 177 Md. 393, 9 A. (2d) 572 (1939) ; and
see Thomsen, Presumptions and Burden of Proof in Res Ip8a L oquitur
Cases in Marylan4 (1939) 3 Md. L. Rev. 285.
14223 Mass. 257, 111 N. E. 785 (1916). To the same effect Is Hazleton v.
First Nat. Stores, 88 N. H. 409, 190 A. 280 (1937) ; see also, Klein v.
Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. (2d) 272, 93 P. (2d) 799 (1939).
1 Supra, n. 8; the New Hampshire Court also so holds in the Hazleton
case.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. VIII

deny such right to another member, damaged in the same
way, who was in fact the actual purchaser, seems at least
odd.
It seems questionable whether it would not have been
preferable to dispense with the use of artificial and technical means of evading the requirement of privity of contract, and to rest the seller's liability squarely on a warranty obligation imposed by law and not by contract, needing no privity between buyer and seller to bring it into
being.16 Presumably the Court felt17 precluded from doing
so by prior authority in this State.
In dealing with the extent of the seller's liability for
breach of warranty, the Court's ruling that the plaintiff
could recover, if found to have contracted trichinosis by
eating the meat, only if he showed that it had been cooked
in the "usual or proper" manner, taken in conjunction with
language used in other parts of the opinion, inferentially
raises a question as to whether, either in theory or fact,
there can ever be a recovery on an implied warranty in such
cases. For the Court states specifically that "the danger of
contracting trichinosis can be eliminated by proper cooking"' 8 and goes on to recite the expert testimony that cooking the meat thoroughly, so that all portions are heated to
a temperature of 137 to 150 degrees, will completely destroy the parasite.
If these words mean, as standing alone they might be
taken to mean, that cooking to be "proper" must meet the
above requirements, then the buyer who complies with the
Court's ruling as to showing cooking in the "usual or
proper manner" necessarily disproves in so doing his claim
that he contracted trichinosis from meat so cooked. A
trichinosis-infected plaintiff under such a standard would
be either unable to show "proper" cooking or unable to
show injury from defendant's meat; in either case he would
"See as to this, in addition to the authorities cited supra, n. 7, Note
(1939) 6 Univ. of Chi. L. Rev. 514.
"1Cases cited supra, n. 4. Conceivably, the expressions in those cases
might be regarded as obiter. Flaccomio v. Eysink was an action in tort;
State v. Consolidated Gas, Elec. L. & P. Co. a suit under Lord Campbell's
Act; in Poplar v. Hochschild, Kohn & Co. there was in fact privity of
contract between plaintiff and defendant; the instant case consequently
could be said to be the first case in the State raising the question directly
in a suit based on breach of warranty. However, in both the Flaccomio
and Consolidated Gas Co. cases, it was the absence of any warranty obligation that caused relief to be refused and it was because of lack of privity
of contract that the Court refused to find a warranty as existing in the
plaintiff's favor.
"IItalics supplied.
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be precluded from recovering on his claim of breach of
warranty.
While there are decisions that might support such a
result," it seems improbable that this was intended by the
Court, since it also states: "It is not necessary, of course,
for the plaintiff . .. to prove that the pork was cooked at
a specific temperature or for a specific length of time....
The implied warranty in the case before us was . . . that
it [the pork] was wholesome and fit to eat after ordinary
domestic cooking."' Presumably, then by "proper" cooking, the Court means domestically rather than scientifically
proper.
It is nevertheless not altogether clear from the opinion
just what is the degree of proof required in this respect of
the plaintiff or what is the extent of the seller's implied
warranty in such cases. The relatively few decisions elsewhere in trichinosis cases are for the most part equally
lacking in clarity and present a somewhat confused picture. They may be grouped roughly into four classes as
follows:
(1) Cases refusing recovery where the meat was used
in an unusual manner,21which the seller could not reasonably have anticipated.
refusing recovery where plaintiff shows thor(2) Cases 22
ough cooking.
(3) Cases allowing recovery where there is a showing
that the meat was cooked though not to an extent that
would destroy trichinae."3
(4) Cases refusing recovery where the meat was
cooked insufficiently to constitute proper cooking.2"
The Court in the instant case cites together cases from
each of the first three classes in support of its conclusion.
10 See cases cited infra, n. 22.
20Italics supplied. The lower Court had refused the defendant's first
prayer, which would have directed a verdict for the defendant, if cooking
to less than 137 degrees was found by the jury (Record, p. 44).
21Cheli v. Cudahy Bros. Co., 267 Mich. 690, 255 N. W. 414 (1934);
Dressen v. Merkel, 284 N. Y. Supp. 697 (1936), aff'd 272 N. Y. 574, 4 N. E.
(2d) 744 (1936).
22Wiehardt v. Krey Packing Co., 264 Ill. App. 504 (1932); Zorger v.
Hillman's 287 Ill. App. 357, 4 N. E. (2d) 900 (1936) ; Cudahy Packing Co.
v. McPhail, 170 Miss. 508, 155 S. 163 (1934) ; Feinstein v. Reeves, 14 F.
Supp. 167 (D. C. S. D. N. Y., 1936). Contra, Gindraux v. Maurice Mercantile Co., 4 Cal. (2d) 206, 47 P. (2d) 708 (1935).
23Holt v. Mann, 294 Mass. 21, 200 N. E. 403 (1926) Rinaldi v. Mohican
Co., 225 N. Y. 70, 121 N. E. 471 (1918) ; McSpedon v. Kunz, 271 N. Y. 131,
2 N. E. (2d) 513 (1936); Greco v. S. S. Kresge Co., 277 N. Y. 26, 12 N. E.
(2d)
557 (1938).
2
, Eisenbach v. Gimbel Bros., 281 N. Y. 474, 24 N. V. (2d) 131 (1939).
But of. Catani v. Swift, 251 Pa. 52, 90 A. 931 (1915).
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Under the -firstgroup are cases such as Cheli v. Cudahy
Bros. Co., 25 where the plaintiff had used the infected pork
to make raw sausages to be eaten uncooked, without informing the seller that this was the intended use. There is
general agreement that one who sells food which is normally cooked before use does not warrant its wholesomeness or fitness for consumption if used without cooking.
The warranty imposed upon him in this respect arises because, as stated in the instant case, the purchase in itself
makes known by implication the purpose for which the
article is bought. Hence, if the article is put to an abnormal
use, there can be no implication from the mere fact of sale
that the seller knew that this was intended by the purchaser. Of course, if the article is one that is normally 2sold
6
for consumption uncooked, the usual warranties attach.
Under the second group are cases such as Zorger v. Hillmann's27 where the plaintiff claimed to have contracted
trichinosis from eating pork chops cooked over a full gas
flame for fifteen minutes. The Court denied recovery because "the evidence in this case shows that the chops were
thoroughly cooked, and, therefore, under the testimony of
the doctors, could not contain trichinae capable of infecting the plaintiff." Similarly in Feinstein v. Reeves s it was
held that, the plaintiff having alleged thorough cooking, it
was incumbent upon him to show that trichinae-infected
pork, when thoroughly cooked, would cause trichinosis,
29
whereas the evidence conclusively showed otherwise.
Thus here recovery is denied when the article sold is
used in what is plainly a usual and proper way, and it is
held in effect that the very fact of such user negatives the
plaintiff's claim of injury. On their facts, the cases here
do not go to the length of requiring the purchaser to show
cooking to an extent destructive of trichinae in order to
satisfy the requirement of normal use, but hold only that
the plaintiff's claim was not supported by the evidence
since by his own testimony he had shown cooking sufficient to render the meat incapable of containing any infectious parasite. However, in the Zorger case, the Court, on
the basis that a seller of pork warrants it as fit for con25 Cited supra, n. 21.
16Catalanello v. Cudahy Packing Co., 27 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 637 (1941);
Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S. W. (2d) 828 (1942).
"Cited supra, n. 22.
28Cited supra, n. 22.
29 However, in Gindraux v. Maurice Mercantile 0o., cited supra, n. 22, a
directed verdict for the defendant under such conditions was reversed.
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sumption only if properly cooked, approved an instruction
that the plaintiff must show the meat sold by the defendant
was unfit for consumption by human beings after having
been cooked to 137 degrees-something which seems generally accepted as impossible of proof.
Cases in the third group allow recovery only where the
meat has been subjected to "ordinary domestic cooking",
but do not regard this as necessarily synonymous with
cooking to a point that would destroy trichinae. As hereinbefore stated, it is presumably this view which the
Court of Appeals has taken in the instant case. It is difficult to say with any certainty what the test here suggested
imposes as an obligation on the buyer. Leading cases are
Holt v. Mann and McSpedon v. Kunz,3 0 both cited in the instant case.
In Holt v. Mann a ham had been prepared according to
"approved directions in a well known cook book" and nine
persons became ill with trichinosis after eating it. The
Court stated that, though it was true that trichinae will be
killed by exposure to heat of 137 degrees, yet in ordinary
household cooking it may not be easy to be sure that every
part of a ham will be heated to so high a degree; that it
could have been found that the ham was cooked as thoroughly as could be expected in family cooking without
killing the trichinae with which it was infected.
In McSpedon v. Kunz the plaintiff testified that she
knew nothing about requisite degrees of heat or about
trichinae; all she knew was that the chops involved should
be well cooked and she fried them in a pan until she supposed they were well cooked. The Court held this to be
sufficient to allow recovery on a suit for breach of warranty, saying:
"What would any ordinary housewife do? She buys
meats at reputable butchers, supposing it fit to eat
after being cooked in the customary way and manner.
The expert in this case testified that he did not know
those things until he had been taught them in the professional school. . . This requisite of thorough heating and the nature of trichinae may seem very simple
things to us and to experts who are dealing with these
matters daily, but there are many people in this country who know nothing about trichinosis or the danger
lurking in meats or the requisite heating point to des Cited supra, n. 23.
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stroy parasites, and who must rely, and do rely, upon
the grocer and the butcher and such reputable concerns as Armour & Company to sell them wholesome
food .... Our statute of implied warranties was
passed for the very purpose of protecting and safeguarding the life and health of people like Mrs. McSpedon and her little family."
It is apparent that the Massachusetts court is much
more guarded than the New York court in discussing what
constitutes the ordinary and proper use of food sold for
consumption after cooking."1 In effect, the latter tells the
seller he must warrant the wholesomeness of his meat if
prepared only to the extent to be reasonably expected of
the buyer to whom he sells in any particular case, who
moreover cannot ordinarily be reasonably expected to
have any particular knowledge as to the amount of cooking
necessary to destroy harmful parasites in the meat.
This creates a shifting standard of liability, since different degrees of knowledge in this respect may reasonably be expected of different buyers. Thus it has been held
subsequently in New York that where the buyer is a
restaurant with an experienced chef, there can be no recovery, the buyer here being held to a greater degree of
knowledge as to the extent of cooking requisite than in the
McSpedon case; 2 here presumably nothing short of cooking to the degree required to destroy trichinae would satisfy the requirement of ordinary domestic cooking as a prerequisite to suit on the implied warranty of wholesomeness.
In the opinion in the instant case, nothing is said as to
the extent or degree of cooking practiced by the plaintiff's
wife.3 According to the record, however, there was testimony to the effect that the meat was cooked the way the
wife had always cooked it; that it was fried some thirty to
thirty-five minutes; that it looked brown and cooked
enough to eat.8
This would seem sufficient under the McSpedon case to
support a finding by the jury that there had been ordinary
81See

Lehman, J., dissenting in McSpedon v. Kunz.
32 Eisenbach v. Gimbel Bros., cited 8upra, n. 24.
33 This Is true also in some cases elsewhere in which recovery has been
allowed. See Rinaldl v. Mohican Co., 225 N. Y. 70, 121 N. E. 471 (1918)
Catani v. Swift, 251 Pa. 52, 95 A. 931 (1915).
11 Record, pp. 8, 9, 12. However there was also testimony (p. 12) that
the meat was red in color after cooking, which would indicate insufficient
cooking.
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domestic cooking; whether this would be true under the
view taken in the Holt case is at least doubtful. But, as
pointed out by the New York court, the prevailing concepts
of policy lying back of the statutory implied warranty,
as well as the ordinary understanding of the buying public,
would call for a construction of the warranty most favorable to the buyer, especially perhaps in sales of food.
There would be no greater burden imposed upon the seller
in holding him responsible for the existence of harmful
parasites in meat sold by him than exists when he is held
responsible for the existence of harmful substances in
goods sold by him in the original package. As said by the
Court in the present case, quoting Cardozo, C. J., in Ryan
v. ProgressiveGroceryStores:15 "The burden may be heavy.
It is one of the hazards of the business." The same reasons of public policy which promote the imposition of liability without fault or knowledge in the latter case apply
with equal force to the former."

EMANCIPATION OF INFANT BY PARENT'S CRUELTY
FOR PURPOSES OF CONTROL OVER
EARNINGS AND SERVICES
Lucas, et ux., v. The Maryland Drydock Company'
The plaintiff's son, being eighteen years of age, obtained
a job at the Maryland Drydock Co. for wages of about forty
dollars a week. On his first pay day, the boy returned home
and found a note from his father directing him to leave
his pay on the desk and his father would see him later.
The boy left five dollars and fifty cents to reimburse his
father for car fare and lunch money and went to bed.
Between twelve-thirty and one in the morning the father
arrived home; and upon finding the note, he went up to the
boy's room, awakened him, and argued with the boy about
5255 N. Y. 388, 175 N. E. 105 (1931).
8 Perhaps with greater. It is stated in the expert testimony in the present case that the packers could eliminate all danger of trichinosis by refrigerating all their pigs at about 5 degrees for about 21 days. This fact
Is commented upon by the Court in the McSpedon case, and seems to have
had considerable weight. For treatment of a different aspect of the problem
of warranty of food, see Note, The Doctrine of Implied Warranty Between
Restaurant-keeper and Guest (1938) 2 Md. L. Rev. 277.
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